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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigates the attributes of firms that choose to voluntarily delist in Korea, including the evolution of 
firms after delisting, using performance indicators such as total assets, revenue, and net income. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the higher the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the higher the growth prospects and 
liquidity, the greater the incentive for voluntary delisting. In addition, firms in non-high-tech industries choose to 
delist more often than those in high-tech industries. Further, firms that have delisted show lower total assets, revenues, 
and net incomes than listed firms, and these gaps increase over time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
elisting refers to the loss of the trading eligibility of a listed company’s marketable securities and the 
cancellation of a qualified listing. Generally, delisting happens under the authority of a stock 
exchange. When a serious management problem occurs (e.g., bankruptcy) and investors incur losses, 
or when there is a risk of undermining the order of the stock market, the stock exchange will delist a company that 
meets the delisting criteria in order to protect investors, unless the reason for delisting is resolved during a certain 
grace period. Alternatively, a company may voluntarily delist itself through the public purchase of treasury stock. 
 
Many unlisted companies undertake an initial public offering (IPO) to obtain funding without debt by issuing shares, 
despite the complicated conditions and procedures of IPOs. Although IPOs are convenient for capital financing, one 
major disadvantage is that shares become dispersed. As a company owned solely by the largest stockholder comes to 
be owned jointly by general stockholders, the company’s management process may become more difficult. 
Consequently, a company that has grown beyond a certain level after listing will often want to delist voluntarily to 
enhance management efficiency. 
 
Additionally, a company with a foreign investor as its largest stockholder may delist itself to resume listing in another 
overseas stock market where it can be valued properly. According to the Korea Exchange, for example, between 
December 2011 and December 2014, the stock market rose by 105% in Japan and 33.6% in China, while the increase 
was only 5.3% in South Korea; thus, long-lasting stock market recession is the main reason that foreign funds have 
left the Korean stock market. 
 
To protect investors, securities regulations generally prevent entrepreneurial ventures from entering the stock market 
(Carpentier and Suret, 2010). Accordingly, listing a company can be a time- and resource-intensive process. Delisting 
can be just as demanding, especially voluntarily delisting, because a company’s largest shareholder and senior 
management cannot simply choose to delist at will. The largest shareholder must first purchase a majority of the shares 
through a tender offer. Because the tender offer price is usually set at a premium compared with the market’s stock 
price, delisting is thus expensive.1 Nonetheless, firms do sometimes choose to voluntarily delist. 
 
Some firms decide to delist within three to five years of listing. One company even delisted after a single year.2 Recent 
press reports suggest that an increasing number of firms delist because of decision-making difficulties caused by 
shareholder influence, which outweigh the benefits of being a public company (e.g., ease of financing and 
enhancement of corporate credit). For example, Dell Inc. delisted in 2013 and regained its entrepreneurial spirit. After 
the company went private, the board consisted of only three members, including the founder, Michael Dell, which 
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made it easier for the board to make critical business decisions.3 Although the outcome of Dell’s privatization remains 
to be seen, the firm chose to delist to prevent shareholder interventions. 
 
Undervaluation is the most commonly stated reason for voluntary delisting. With stock prices continuously falling 
because of the economic recession, many managers believe that the stock market has lost its role as a platform for 
financing. If a stock market values a firm incorrectly, the firm has no reason to remain listed and continue to pay large 
maintenance fees. Consequently, many firms choose to go private. 
 
This study examines the characteristics of companies that voluntarily delist to verify whether the reasons given by the 
press and companies for voluntary delisting are reasonable given that companies must give up the many advantages 
of listing and absorb delisting costs. Additionally, this study verifies whether companies that voluntarily delist achieve 
their intended outcomes from delisting. For this purpose, the business performance of voluntarily delisted firms after 
their delisting is examined. 
 
Comparisons of performance indicators such as total assets, sales, and net profits between firms that voluntarily 
delisted and those that remained listed reveal that the performance of delisting companies worsened after delisting. 
This finding may indicate that companies that have voluntarily delisted should reconsider whether they have achieved 
their goals by delisting. These results provide useful information for companies considering voluntarily delisting as 
well as for their interested parties. 
 
VOLUNTARY DELISTING REGULATIONS AND STATUS 
 
Voluntary Delisting Regulations 
 
Firms gain numerous benefits by going public, including easier financing, increased investor awareness, and improved 
financial transparency. For example, firms are able to raise capital through the issuance of new shares, thereby 
increasing their liquidity. Firms that are not public must raise capital through their small pool of shareholders or 
through a bank. Public firms, however, can raise capital from a wider pool of investors, which also increases 
shareholder involvement. Additionally, public firms can gain tax advantages over private firms, such as exemption 
from share transfer income tax and dividend income tax. Going public also provides public relations benefits and 
enhanced public confidence, both of which can boost brand image and operating performance. 
 
Nonetheless, since 1996, the number of voluntarily delisted firms has increased, even though voluntary delisting is a 
lengthy process involving numerous stakeholders, including regulators, shareholders, creditors, management, and 
employees. It is important for a firm to consider the circumstances of these various stakeholders and ensure that they 
do not incur economic losses due to voluntary delisting. To minimize such losses, policymakers regulate the delisting 
process and review whether the necessary procedures havebeen followed before approving delisting applications. 
Delisting is a time-consuming process (Morgenstern et al., 2004) because a firm must reach an agreement with each 
of its stakeholders and comply with the applicable regulations. It is therefore important to examine the regulations 
governing voluntary delisting. 
 
The Korea Exchange acts as the sole securities exchange operator for stocks and derivatives in Korea. As the overseer 
of capital markets, the Korea Exchange maintains fairness and stability by establishing rules and detailed enforcement 
regulations for listing, announcements, and delisting. It also protects investor interests and ensures stock market 
transparency. Accordingly, firms that voluntarily delist must be reviewed by the listing committee in accordance with 
the applicable regulations (KOSPI Market Listing Regulation, 2014; KOSDAQ Market Listing Regulation, 2014). 
 
First, the largest shareholder of the firm must purchase any outstanding shares (including foreign shares and depositary 
receipts of foreign shares) through a tender offer. This largest shareholder announces to the public that it will purchase 
the shares at a specified time and price. These requirements protect minority shareholders during the voluntary 
delisting process. However, as tender offers are usually made at a premium compared with the market’s stock price, 
delisting can become expensive. For example, when mobile phone camera component manufacturer Cowell Ltd 
delisted in 2009, it purchased shares through a tender offer of KRW 4,300 per share, which amounted to a 25% 
premium over the market price of KRW 3,510. Indeed, delisting can be just as time- and resource-intensive as listing. 
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Second, firms delisting from the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) Exchange must demonstrate that 95% 
of their common shares are owned by the largest shareholder on the day of the delisting application. In other words, a 
company cannot apply for delisting if the largest shareholder has less than 95% of shareholder equity. By contrast, on 
the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) Exchange, there are no clear guidelines for the 
largest shareholder’s ownership percentage when delisting; however, the minority shareholder protection procedures 
are similar to those of the KOSPI Exchange. If minority shareholders oppose a delisting, delisting costs will increase, 
or the delisting will be withdrawn altogether. For example, Citibank, the largest shareholder of Citibank Korea, began 
acquiring the shares of minority shareholders in June 2004. It postponed the delisting process for a year, though, 
because it was unable to acquire the remaining 260,000 shares by April 2005. 
 
Third, the largest shareholder must promise investors who have not accepted the tender offer that they will be given 
an opportunity to sell their shares within a certain period after delisting. The largest shareholder must also ensure that 
the other conditions of the tender offer are consistent with public interest and investor protection requirements, which 
usually means that minority shareholders who wish to sell their shares after delisting (usually within a period of six 
months) must be permitted to sell them to the largest shareholder at the tender offer price. These rules protect minority 
shareholders and ensure that firms fulfill their responsibilities, even after delisting. As the aforementioned regulations 
suggest, delisting can occur only after strict criteria are met; consequently, the largest shareholder and senior 
management cannot act unilaterally, and delisting can be as time- and resource-intensive as going public. 
 
Voluntary Delisting Status 
 
Between 1996 and 2012, 49 firms voluntarily delisted from the KOSPI and KOSDAQ Exchanges. Voluntary delisting 
continued until 2005 and then stopped for three years between 2006 and 2008. It then became active again in 2009. 
Voluntary delisting has occurred frequently during three periods: (1) right after the Asian financial crisis, when nine 
firms delisted in 1998 (18.37%) and six firms delisted in 1999 (12.24%); (2) in 2004 and 2005, when six firms 
(12.24%) and seven firms (14.29%), respectively, voluntarily delisted; and (3) in 2012, when five firms voluntarily 
delisted (10.20%). 
 
Of the 49 firms that voluntarily delisted between 1996 and 2012, seven (14.28%) were financial institutions and 42 
(85.72%) were nonfinancial institutions. Of the 14 firms that voluntarily delisted from the KOSPI Exchange, four 
were financial institutions and 10 were nonfinancial institutions. Of the 35 firms that voluntarily delisted from the 
KOSDAQ Exchange, three were financial institutions, and 32 were nonfinancial institutions. Thus, 71.43% of 
voluntarily delisted firms were from the KOSDAQ Exchange, suggesting that KOSPI-listed firms, which tend to be 
larger and more financially stable, are more cautious about their decisions to voluntarily delist. 
 
17 (35%) firms of the 49 firms were delisted within three years of going public, all of which had been listed on the 
KOSDAQ. Of the 32 nonfinancial KOSDAQ firms, 70% (22 firms) delisted within five years of going public. The 
process of listing and delisting within a short timeframe is costly, not only for the company, but for society. By 
contrast, 71% (10) of the 14 firms that delisted from the KOSPI Exchange had been public for longer than 10 years.4 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Literature on Delisted Firms 
 
The literature on voluntary delisting can be classified into three main periods. The literature of the 1980s focused on 
the effects of voluntary delisting on shareholder wealth and profits. In the 1990s, the literature mainly analyzed the 
financial attributes of voluntarily delisting firms. Then, in 2002, after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in the United States, the costs of being listed significantly increased, and the literature began to focus on the specific 
reasons behind the steep increase in the number of voluntarily delisting firms (United States House of Representatives, 
2002). 
 
DeAngelo et al. (1984) analyzed 72 firms that voluntarily delisted between 1973 and 1980 to assess the effect of 
delisting on shareholder wealth. Their results showed that voluntary delisting ultimately increased company 
profitability by reducing maintenance costs and enabling management to make faster business decisions. However, 
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DeAngelo et al. (1984) also suggested that voluntary delisting treated minority shareholders unfairly by forcing them 
out of the investor pool. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) argued that voluntary delisting resolves the free cash flow agency 
problem and that firms with a high level of undistributed cash flow are more likely to go private. This phenomenon is 
more prevalent in firms in which management possesses a low share of equity. 
 
Rao et al. (1995) analyzed 118 firms that voluntarily delisted between 1984 and 1988 to determine their common 
attributes. They suggested that if earnings attributable to shareholders are in the form of potential cash, such as market 
value or growth potential, firms will likely maintain their listed status. However, if earnings attributable to 
shareholders are closer to actual cash, such as dividends, firms will likely go private. Halpern et al. (1999) analyzed 
126 firms that voluntarily delisted between 1981 and 1985 by separating them into two categories based on whether 
the management equity share was high or low, determining whether there were any differences in the leveraged buyout 
(LBO) method. The results revealed a significant difference between the two groups in terms of the LBO motive and 
transaction method. Where management had a high (low) equity share, leverage exceeded (were below) debt 
capabilities. 
 
During 2001 and 2002, major corporate accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco) had a significant 
effect on investor confidence in financial reporting integrity. Congress passed SOX on July 25, 2002 to help restore 
public trust (Chang et al., 2012). The number of voluntarily delisting firms has increased since SOX, and various 
studies have tried to determine the reason. Morgenstern et al. (2004) analyzed post-SOX voluntary delisting from a 
theoretical perspective. Their research showed that the number of firms voluntarily delisting from the US stock 
exchange increased by 30% during the 16-month periods before and after SOX, primarily among firms with 
undervalued share prices relative to firm value. 
 
Marosi and Massoud (2007) found that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, 
and lower market momentum were more likely to go private. Moreover, they determined that an increase in audit fees 
due to SOX was the key trigger for the increase in voluntary delisting. Leuz et al. (2008) found that, after SOX, many 
firms went private due to agency problems, distress, and increased compliance costs. However, their findings 
suggested that insider interests also influence the decision to go private, and at least for some firms, cost savings are 
not the only consideration. For example, firms with weaker governance and outside monitoring, larger accruals, and 
larger free cash flows are more likely to go private. 
 
In the UK institutional setting, Pour and Lasfer (2013) investigated the determinants and consequences of voluntary 
delisting. They focused on the effects of leverage on the delisting decision and showed that firms unable to raise 
additional equity capital were more likely to opt for voluntary delisting. However, they had insufficient data to 
determine what happened to those firms after they went private. 
 
The literature on delisting in Korea is limited to studies of compulsory delisting. The regulations imposed by financial 
authorities are crucial for maintaining the integrity of the capital market (Hwang et al., 2014). The Korea Exchange 
implemented a substantial review system for delisting from the KOSDAQ Exchange in February 2009 and 
strengthened its delisting policy. Park and Jee (2010) argued that the introduction of this review system significantly 
reduced earnings management by listed firms, thereby increasing the transparency of accounting information and 
restoring market confidence. KOSDAQ Listed Companies Association (2010) adopted a different approach and 
analyzed the insolvency patterns of compulsorily delisted firms using financial ratios. Additionally, Hwang et al. 
(2014) verified that nonfinancial information can be a good leading indicator for delisting. They argued that a delisting 
model using nonfinancial information is meaningful because it can provide diverse stakeholders with early warning 
signals that predict. 
 
The media have mentioned various reasons for delisting. Some firms voluntarily delist to prevent intervention by 
minority shareholders and financial authorities, to increase dividends, and to maximize parent-company earnings. 
Other firms have been known to hand over major shareholdings and then announce tender offers to accelerate the 
managerial decision-making process. Additionally, several firms have chosen to delist because of undervaluation in 
the stock market and the resulting difficulties in raising capital through public offerings. This research empirically 
analyzes the attributes of voluntarily delisting firms and investigates how such firms have changed since going private. 
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Hypothesis Development 
 
The most commonly mentioned reason for voluntary delisting is the undervaluation of shares. If management believes 
that the true value of a company exceeds the market value, they may decide to delist voluntarily. Marois and Massoud 
(2007) argue that a company’s potential growth options can be measured by q-ratio. They claim that there are two 
options that a company with a high q-ratio can take. First, it may wish to stay public to raise further financing in the 
market for obtaining additional business opportunities in the future. Another option is that a company may wish to 
take it private in order to enjoy the implied growth options resulted from a high q-ratio. 
 
In the Korean stock market, however, firms might not voluntarily delist to improve their value. According to the 
Financial Supervisory Service, Kyung Nam Energy Co., Ltd began the process of delisting through the public purchase 
of treasury stocks in 2014 and resumed the process in 2015. Kyung Nam Energy Co., Ltd embarked on the public 
purchase of treasury stocks of 15.4 million shares in February 2014, but only 8.0 million shares (51.80%) responded 
to the purchase, so the company was unable to meet the requirement of purchasing 95% of the total stocks it had 
issued, and it thus failed to delist. Additionally, Busan City Gas Co. Ltd proceeded with a public purchase for delisting 
at the end of 2013 despite its previous failure to delist. Daesung Energy Co. Ltd also considered voluntarily delisting 
in 2004. In November 2012, Ko-won Energy Service Co., Ltd voluntarily left the stock market after a public purchase. 
These companies, which run their businesses based on franchises, have explained that the cost of listing (including 
delays in management decision-making and obligation to make public announcements) was the reason that they 
applied for delisting, rather than merely an effect of listing. 
 
High-growth firms go private so that their largest shareholders can take advantage of good performance. Thus, this 
study proposes the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher growth prospects are more likely to delist voluntarily. 
 
Listed firms have numerous stakeholders including regulatory authorities, shareholders, creditors, management, and 
employees. To delist voluntarily, firms must reach an agreement with these various stakeholders, particularly with 
minority stakeholders who tend to have no voice during the voluntary delisting process. Voluntarily delisting firms 
resolve any conflicts of interest with minority shareholders through tender offers. Therefore, if the largest shareholder 
ratio is already high, fewer shares must be acquired, resulting in a lower financial burden during the voluntary delisting 
process. 
 
Moreover, if the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is already high, raising capital externally through a public 
offering becomes less meaningful. Maintaining a listed status also becomes redundant, because few shares are being 
traded in the markets, resulting in inefficient price formation. If outstanding shares do not meet certain monthly trade 
volume requirements, firms could be forced to delist. In the KOSPI Exchange, compulsory delisting occurs if the 
average monthly trading volume of a firm for two consecutive six-month periods is less than 1% of the outstanding 
shares. In the KOSDAQ Exchange, compulsory delisting occurs when the average monthly trading volume for two 
consecutive three-month periods is less than 1% of the outstanding shares. Consequently, if the shareholding ratio of 
the largest shareholder is too high, a firm could be compulsorily delisted because of low share-trading activity. In this 
context, firms might delist voluntarily to prevent compulsory delisting. Accordingly, this research proposes the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a high largest shareholder ratio are more likely to voluntarily delist than firms with a low 
largest shareholder ratio. 
 
The growth of a company has a positive relationship with liquidity. Firms with high growth prospects tend to have 
higher liquidity and better cash flow (Kim and Cho, 1996). If a company with large cash reserves and high liquidity 
is undervalued in the stock market, it is likely to use internal cash reserves rather than obtain financing through the 
stock market. Because of the maintenance fees required to remain listed, it may be better for such a company to delist. 
Accordingly, firms with high liquidity are more likely to voluntarily delist than those with low liquidity. 
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This situation can be considered from another perspective. For a company to delist voluntarily, the largest shareholder 
must acquire the outstanding shares, typically at a premium. In this context, Jeong and Ha (2006) found that a tender 
offer results in a positive excess return. In other words, a firm seeking to delist voluntarily must have sufficient capital 
and liquidity to pay more than the market price to acquire shares through a tender offer.5 Such a firm must have 
sufficient current assets for a rapid conversion into cash. With this in mind, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) analyzed 263 
voluntarily delisted firms between 1980 and 1989 and showed a positive relationship between free cash flow and 
voluntary delisting. In other words, without sufficient liquidity, firms are unable to easily decide whether to go private. 
Thus, regardless of one’s perspective, voluntary delisting requires cash and liquidity. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Liquid firms are more likely than other firms to delist voluntarily.  
 
The most representative major industries in South Korea are high-tech industries such as electronics and chemistry.6 
The number of continuously listed companies in high-tech industries is about 1.4 times the number of those in other 
industries. Companies included in the representative major industries in South Korea are preferred by investors, and 
it is very likely that their stock prices have been formed fairly. Thus, it is easier for companies in high-tech industries 
to increase and finance capital than for companies in non-high-tech industries. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
industries with a high capital demand, such as electronics and chemistry, would not decide to delist easily. 
 
In addition, companies in high-tech industries experience greater uncertainty about their future business performance 
than those in other industries as well as a wider variety of risks, which should be shared with investors (Kim, 2012). 
The motivation to remain listed and keep up with the high costs for listing may be lower in non-high-tech industries 
than in high-tech industries. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Firms in non-high-tech industries are more likely to delist voluntarily than firms in high-tech industries. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Research Model 
 
This section investigates the attributes of voluntarily delisting firms. These firms were compared with firms that 
remained listed throughout the sample period to identify any differences. The attribute variables chosen were the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (LARGE), growth prospects (PERDM), liquidity (CASSET), and high-
tech industry (HTIDM). 
 
According to Korean listing regulations, the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (LARGE) must exceed 95% 
if a company wishes to delist voluntarily. Firms that fall short of this ratio must proceed with a tender offer if they 
wish to delist. The decision to delist voluntarily is easier when the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is 
already high, because there are fewer shares to be acquired. 
 
The price to earnings ratio (PER; price per share/earnings per share) indicates how much of a company’s profitability 
is reflected in the share price (i.e., company value). If the PER is relatively high, the company could be overvalued. 
Previous studies have mostly used the PER as a proxy for growth (Core et al., 1999; Park et al., 2006); however, in 
this research, the PER was used as a dummy variable because the industry PER varied widely during the 16-year 
sample period and needed to be controlled for. With reference to Kim (2012), this research also used a dummy variable. 
Thus, if a company’s PER exceeded the relevant industry PER, the variable was assigned a value of one and zero 
otherwise.7 
 
Previous studies suggest that having sufficient free cash flow can be a reason for voluntary delisting (Jenson, 1986; 
Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). Firms that have large free cash flow due to good performance can more easily choose to go 
private. From the company’s perspective, having a large amount of current assets is similar to having cash because 
such assets can be converted quickly. Accordingly, firms with high liquidity (CASSET) are more likely to delist 
voluntarily. 
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In addition, non-high-tech firms have less motivation to stay listed than high-tech firms, because the former have 
lower demand for capital. Thus, because non-high-tech firms are more likely to delist voluntarily, a firm’s inclusion 
in a high-tech industry (HTIDM) produces a negative relationship. The following model was formulated with delisting 
as the dependent variable and the four attribute variables as the variables of interest. 
 
To empirically test the hypotheses, we estimate the following logistic regression model: 
 
DELISTi,t+1 = α + β1 PERDMi,t + β2 LARGEi,t + β3CASSETi,t + β4HTIDMi,t + β5LEVi,t + β6TATi,t + β7ROAi,t 
+ β8SIZEi,t + εi,t 
 
where DELISTi,t+1 is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i voluntarily delisted in period t +1 and zero otherwise; 
PERDMi is a dummy variable equal to one if the PER of a firm was higher than the PER of the industry median in 
period t and zero otherwise; LARGEi,t is the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder; CASSETi,t is the current ratio 
(i.e., current assets/current debt); and HTIDMi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i belonged to a high-tech 
industry in period t and zero otherwise. 
 
This research used the following control variables taken from the literature: leverage (LEV), total asset turnover 
(TAT), return on assets (ROA), and company size (SIZE). LEV is a key indicator of financial solvency. Much of the 
literature has focused on the effects of leverage in private and public firms. Rao et al. (1995) found no statistically 
significant difference in leverage between public and private firms. However, when Halpern et al. (1999) classified 
firms that went private into two groups based on whether their largest shareholder ratios were high or low, they found 
that the group with higher ratios used significantly more leverage. In other words, firms with high leverage are more 
likely to voluntarily delist, resulting in a positive relationship. 
 
TAT is a proxy for activity that indicates how efficiently a company uses its assets; a company with high TAT is more 
likely to voluntarily delist. ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income to assets. Because net income is the bottom 
line figure, it accurately reflects a company’s profitability. Firms with high ROA are more inclined to go private to 
take full advantage of profits. Finally, as an adjustment for differences in company size, SIZE was included as the log 
of total assets in year t (Kang et al., 2013). 
 
Sample Selection 
 
The subjects of this study were companies that voluntarily delisted from the Korean stock market between 1996 and 
2012. The 49 companies applied for voluntary delisting from the KOSPI and KOSDAQ during this period. Listing 
status data were obtained from the Korea Exchange listing announcement system (http://www.krx.co.kr). Share price 
and financial data were obtained from KIS-Value and Korea’s Corporate Filings Data Analysis, Retrieval, and 
Transfer system (http://dart.fss.or.kr). 
 
Table 1 shows the sample selection process. Of the 49 firms that voluntarily delisted between 1996 and 2002, 34 were 
chosen after a filtering process. Of the 15 exclusions, seven financial institutions were excluded because they had used 
a different accounting approach, which compromised their comparability with nonfinancial institutions. Hankuk Fiber 
Co., Ltd was listed on the KOSDAQ Exchange on July 1, 1996, and delisted less than a year later on November 12, 
1996. Because annual financial data were used in this research, Hankuk Fiber Co., Ltd was thus excluded. Three firms 
with unclear industry classifications and four without obtainable financial data were also excluded. 
 
After the filtering process, 34 firms and 65 firm-years of financial data were selected. For three firms - Dongbang 
Sound, Daelim Metal Industries, and Danup Industries—financial data were usable only for the year preceding 
delisting. Consequently, the sample data include 34 samples of financial data for the ultimate year preceding delisting 
and 31 samples of financial data for the penultimate year before delisting. In total, 65 samples of annual financial data 
were used. 
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Table 1. Sample selection of voluntarily delisted firms 
Sample selection Firms Firm-years 
Voluntarily delisted firms from 1996 to 2012 49 95 
Exclusions   
1. Firms in the finance industry (7) (14) 
2. Firms without a necessary industry code (3) (6) 
3. Firms without necessary financial data (5) (10) 
Final samples 34 65 
Notes: We considered 49 firms that voluntarily delisted from the KOSPI and KOSDAQ Exchanges between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 
2012. Our sample contained 95 observations from the Korea Exchange, the KIS Value Database, and the Dart System of the Financial Supervisory 
Service. In the sample selection procedure, we excluded (1) firms in the finance industry, (2) firms without a necessary industry code, and (3) firms 
without financial data. After the selection procedure, we used a final sample of 65 firm-years for the analysis. Therefore, the full sample consisted 
of 34 samples of financial data for the year preceding delisting and 31 samples of financial data for the penultimate year before delisting. 
 
 
The attributes of voluntarily delisted firms were investigated through a comparison of these firms with listed firms. 
The control sample comprises firms that remained listed in the year that a voluntarily delisted company delisted. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Analysis, and Correlation Analysis 
 
T-test and Wilcoxon-test analyses were conducted on voluntarily delisted and listed firms to investigate the significant 
differences in the key variables during the penultimate and ultimate years before delisting. The results are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the major variables 
Variable 
Mean 
t-value 
Median 
z-value Voluntarily 
delisted Listed 
Voluntarily 
delisted Listed 
Panel A. Two years before sample firm voluntary delisting: n(V.Delisted) = 31, n(Listed) = 592 
PERDM 0.581 0.500 0.87 1.000 0.500 0.87 
LARGE 0.417 0.264 4.36*** 0.407 0.241 3.88*** 
CASSET 0.510 0.468 1.29 0.518 0.470 1.29* 
HTIDM 0.387 0.588 -2.21** 0.000 1.000 -2.20** 
LEV 0.502 0.473 0.61 0.477 0.461 0.56 
TAT 0.993 0.955 0.37 0.877 0.853 0.19 
ROA 0.008 0.016 -0.37 0.027 0.030 -0.17 
SIZE 25.225 25.391 -0.66 25.313 25.096 0.92 
 
Panel B. One year before sample firm voluntary delisting: n(V.Delisted) = 34, n(Listed) = 608 
PERDM 0.765  0.500   3.02*** 1.000 0.500 3.00*** 
LARGE 0.542  0.273   10.04*** 0.494 0.246 4.58*** 
CASSET 0.525  0.456  2.21** 0.524 0.453 2.47*** 
HTIDM 0.412  0.582  -1.96* 0.000 1.000 -1.95** 
LEV 0.510  0.482  0.59 0.528 0.475 0.35 
TAT 1.056  0.975  0.62 0.892 0.890 0.00 
ROA 0.046  -0.001   2.27** 0.025 0.030 -0.35 
SIZE 25.078  25.430  -1.46 25.260 25.149 0.70 
Notes: Variable definitions and measurements are provided in Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
For the growth variable (PERDM), the averages for voluntarily delisted and listed firms in the penultimate year are 
0.581 and 0.500, respectively. For the ultimate year, the averages are 0.765 and 0.500, respectively. The average value 
of the growth variable is higher for voluntarily delisted firms, and there is a larger difference between the two types 
of firms in the ultimate year. The increase in the average value of PERDM suggests that the growth of voluntarily 
delisted firms improved compared with that of listed firms in the ultimate year. Thus, PERDM differs little between 
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voluntarily delisted and listed firms in the penultimate year; however, a significant difference (1% level) emerges in 
the ultimate year. 
 
The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (LARGE) is statistically significantly higher for voluntarily delisted 
companies than for listed firms in the penultimate and ultimate years before delisting. Specifically, in the penultimate 
year, LARGE is 0.417 for voluntarily delisted firms and 0.264 for listed firms. As firms preparing for voluntary 
delisting start acquiring shares, the differences in the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders are even higher in 
the ultimate year when LARGE for voluntarily delisted firms is 0.542, almost double its value for listed firms (0.273).8 
Thus, significant differences in LARGE at the 1% level are observed during the penultimate and ultimate years before 
delisting. 
 
The liquidity variable (CASSET) is higher for voluntarily delisted firms during the penultimate and ultimate years, at 
0.510 versus 0.468 and 0.525 versus 0.456, respectively. This shows that the liquidity of voluntarily delisted firms is 
superior to that of listed firms. The differences are significant at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively, for 
the penultimate and ultimate years before delisting. The high-tech industry variable (HTIDM) is higher for listed firms 
than for voluntarily delisted firms, as stated in Hypothesis 4. The high-tech industry variable values for voluntarily 
delisted versus listed firms in the penultimate and ultimate years are 0.387 versus 0.588 and 0.412 versus 0.582, 
respectively.  
 
Of the control variables - LEV, TAT, ROA, and SIZE - only ROA shows a positive relationship with voluntarily 
delisted firms in the penultimate year. This suggests that firms with higher profitability chose to delist voluntarily 
more often than firms with lower profitability. 
 
I analyzed whether any meaningful correlations exist between the different variables and no significant correlations 
were found since all the correlation coefficients remained below 0.5. Further, a regression analysis of the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) was also conducted to ensure that no multicollinearity existed between the independent 
variables and the VIF of the logit regression analysis showed that no multicollinearity existed between the independent 
variables (Table 3). 9 
 
Attributes of Voluntarily Delisting Firms: Multivariate Logit Analysis 
 
The results of logistic regression analysis for voluntary delisting are given in Table 3. The regression coefficients of 
PERDM (the variable that represents company growth prospects) are 1.042 (Wald X2 = 10.80) and 2.035 (Wald X2 = 
13.86) for the total period and the ultimate year, respectively. Both coefficients show a positive relationship at the 1% 
significance level. However, there is no significant relationship in the penultimate year. Thus, firms with higher growth 
prospects are more likely to delist voluntarily, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Table 3. Logit regression results 
Variable t-2 t-1 Total 
Constant -5.395 (1.47) -2.566 (0.27) -4.072 (1.56) 
PERDM 0.497 (1.34) 2.035 (13.86)*** 1.042 (10.80)*** 
LARGE 4.716 (22.27)*** 7.720 (47.77)*** 5.868 (70.92)*** 
CASSET 1.359 (1.41) 2.141 (3.20)* 1.595 (3.95)** 
HTIDM -0.824 (4.00)** -0.558 (1.67) -0.702 (5.71)** 
LEV -0.025 (0.00) 1.552 (3.05)* 0.712 (1.36) 
TAT -0.176 (0.21) -0.574 (2.00) -0.336 (1.60) 
ROA -1.723 (1.16) 0.161 (0.01) -0.222 (0.11) 
SIZE 0.023 (0.02) -0.224 (1.48) -0.080 (0.43) 
Concordant 76.2% 88.8% 81.8% 
Chi-square 38.87*** 101.78*** 133.04*** 
VIF value 1.36 1.29 1.31 
N 623 642 1,265 
Notes: The table presents coefficients and Z-statistics (in parentheses). (t-2) is two years before a sample firm’s voluntary delisting and (t-1) is one 
year before a sample firm’s voluntary delisting. Based on the results by year, the concordance for year t-2 was 76.2% and the concordance for year 
t-1 was 88.8%. Variable definitions and measurements are provided in Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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The regression coefficient for the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (LARGE) is 4.716 (Wald X2 = 70.92), 
indicating a positive relationship at the 1% significance level. Furthermore, the regression coefficients for the 
penultimate and ultimate years before delisting show positive relationships at the 1% significance level, at 7.720 (Wald 
X2 = 44.77) and 5.868 (Wald X2 = 22.27), respectively. Thus, firms with high largest shareholder ratios are more likely 
to voluntarily delist, supporting Hypothesis 2. The results also show that the forecast value of the shareholding ratio 
of the largest shareholder for voluntary delisting is more significant in the ultimate year than in the penultimate year. 
 
The liquidity variable, CASSET, shows a strong relationship in the same direction as predicted at the 5% and 10% 
significance levels for the total period and the ultimate year, respectively, supporting Hypothesis 3. However, as with 
PERDM, there is no significant relationship in the penultimate year. 
 
The high-tech industry variable (HTIDM) shows a strong relationship in the same direction as predicted at the 5% 
significance level for both the total period and the penultimate year. The actual incidences of voluntary delisting show 
that non-high-tech firms in the textiles, clothing, construction, and wholesale/retail sectors voluntarily delisted more 
often than R&D-intensive high-tech firms. This result suggests that the shape of Korea’s industrial base has a greater 
influence on companies’ decisions to delist voluntarily than do the commonly mentioned reasons for voluntary 
delisting such as control of corporate strategy and technical secrets. 
 
Changes to Voluntarily Delisted Firms After Delisting 
 
This analysis has thus far indicated that firms in non-high-tech sectors with greater largest shareholder ratios, growth 
prospects, and liquidity are more likely to delist voluntarily. This section analyzes how firms change after voluntarily 
delisting by investigating sample firms that chose to release financial data publicly after voluntarily delisting. 
Voluntarily delisted firms are then compared and contrasted with listed firms in the same industry. The control sample 
is chosen using the year of voluntary delisting as the base year; listed firms are selected if they remained listed five 
years after the base year. 
 
Firms with financial data available for the years since their voluntary delisting can be categorized by their annual post-
delisting periods: financial data are available for 28 firms for the first year after their voluntary delisting, 24 for the 
second year, 21 for the third year, 24 for the fourth year, and 19 for the fifth year. The control sample contains 421 
listed firms in the first year, 341 in the second year, 307 in the third year, and 242 in both the fourth and fifth years. 
 
Data available post-delisting—total assets, revenue, and net income—are used for comparisons of management 
performance. The results are shown in Table 4. Figure 1 shows the performance ratios of voluntarily delisted firms to 
listed firms during the five years after delisting. A firm’s performance is measured based on total assets, sales, and net 
income. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the average total assets of voluntarily delisted firms after their delisting are lower than 
those of listed firms. For all five years after delisting, voluntarily delisted firms continue to grow at a lower rate relative 
to listed firms, from 26.2% (KRW 107,000 million for voluntarily delisted firms versus KRW 408,300 million for 
listed firms) to 16.4% (143,200 versus 870,800). This finding suggests that the average total assets of voluntarily 
delisted firms relative to listed firms decrease after delisting and become smaller over time.10 
 
Regarding revenue, the average sales for voluntarily delisted firms in the first year after delisting was compared with 
that of listed firms and which are KRW 101,900 million and KRW 365,200 million respectively. Thus, the revenue of 
voluntarily delisted firms is 27.9% that of listed firms. In the fifth year after delisting, average sales are KRW 115,100 
million for voluntarily delisted firms and KRW 807,600 million for listed firms, a ratio of 14.3%. This finding suggests 
that revenue growth among voluntarily delisted firms decreases each year. 
 
Furthermore, net income growth shows a decreasing trend after companies delist. In the first year after delisting, 
voluntarily delisted firms have the average net income of KRW 3,759 million, while the average net income for listed 
firms is KRW 16,780 million. In the fifth year, the net incomes are KRW 6,968 million and KRW 58,210 million, 
respectively. Hence, the ratio decreases from 22.4% to 12.0%, showing a widening gap in the net income growth rate.  
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Meanwhile, we can also identify the difference between the two groups in Panel B of Table 4 based on the change in 
performances of each group for the voluntary delisted firms and the listed firms over the five periods ( Panel B of 
Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Performance after voluntary delisting 
Panel A: Performance Ratio  Unit: KRW 1 million 
Variable Voluntarily delisted Listed Performance ratio 
(Voluntarily delisted / Listed) 
the first year(t+1) after sample firm voluntary delisting 
N 28 411  
Average Assets 107,000 408,300 26.2% 
Average Sales 101,900 365,200 27.9% 
Average Net Income 3,759 16,780 22.4% 
 
the second year(t+2) after sample firm voluntary delisting 
N 24 341  
Average Assets 92,710 504,500 18.4% 
Average Sales 80,800 461,700 17.5% 
Average Net Income 2,137 25,030 8.5% 
 
the third year(t+3) after sample firm voluntary delisting 
N 21 307  
Average Assets 107,200 560,100 19.1% 
Average Sales 101,500 547,600 18.5% 
Average Net Income 3,512 37,120 9.5% 
 
the fourth year(t+4) after sample firm voluntary delisting 
N 19 242  
Average Assets 115,100 761,000 15.1% 
Average Sales 114,300 725,600 15.8% 
Average Net Income 1,764 57,060 3.1% 
 
the fifth year(t+5) after sample firm voluntary delisting 
N 19 242  
Average Assets 143,200 870,800 16.4% 
Average Sales 115,100 807,600 14.3% 
Average Net Income 6,968 58,210 12.0% 
(Panel 4, Table B continued on next page) 
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(Table 4, Panel B continued) 
 
Panel B: Performance Change Unit: KRW 1 million 
After sample firm voluntary delisting t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Voluntarily 
delisted 
N 28 24 21 19 19 
Average Assets 107,00 92,710 107,200 115,100 143,200 
Performance 
change(Assetst+1/Assetst) 86.6% 115.6% 107.4% 124.4% 86.6% 
Average Sales 101,900 80,800 101,500 114,300 115,100 
Performance ratio 
(Salest+1/Salest) 79.3% 125.6% 112.6% 100.7% 79.3% 
Average Net Income 3,759 2,137 3,512 1,764 6,968 
Performance ratio 
(NIt+1/NIt) 56.9% 164.3% 50.2% 395.0% 56.9% 
Listed 
N 411 341 307 242 242 
Average Assets 408,300 504,500 560,100 761,000 870,800 
Performance 
ratio(Assetst+1/Assetst) 123.6% 111.0% 135.9% 114.4% 123.6% 
Average Sales 365,200 461,700 547,600 725,600 807,600 
Performance 
ratio(Salest+1/Salest) 126.4% 118.6% 132.5% 111.3% 126.4% 
Average Net Income 16,780 25,030 37,120 57,060 58,210 
Performance 
ratio(NIt+1/NIt) 149.2% 148.3% 153.7% 102.0% 149.2% 
 
 
Figure 1. Performance Ratios of Voluntarily Delisted Firms to Listed Firms after Delisting. 
 
Notes: Firm performance is measured by total assets, sales, and net income. 
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The average of total assets, sales, and net income of the voluntarily delisted firms in the second year were decreased 
by 86.6%, 79.3%, and 56.9% respectively, compared with the first year. On the other hand, The average of total assets, 
sales, and net income of the listing firms increased by 123.6%, 126.4%, and 149.2% respectively in the same periods.   
 
However, we should note that performance variables of the voluntarily delisted firms have relevantly larger 
fluctuations than that of the listing firms.   
 
The average total assets for voluntarily delisted firms in the first year after delisting are KRW 107,000 million and the 
fifth year’s average assets of delisted firms are KRW 143,200 million. This means that the average total assets of the 
voluntary delisted firms increased by approximately 1.34 times (143,200 divided by 107,000) after five years since 
delisting. However, the rate of increase of the listed firms’ average assets is approximately 2.13 times (870,800 divided 
by 365,200) during the same periods. 
 
And the average sales and the average net income of voluntary delisted companies were increased by approximately 
1.13 times (115,100 divided by 101,900) and 2.21 times (6,968 divided by 3,759) respectively. But the average sales 
and the average net income of listed firms were increased by approximately 1.85 times (807,600 divided by 365,200) 
and 3.47 times (58,210 divided by 16,780) during the same period. In this comparison, we can note that all the 
performance variables for the listed firms had larger increase.   
 
The results in Table 4 regarding post-delisting management performance differ from the firm’s expectations. Although 
the analysis is limited to five years, the results raise questions about whether management decisions about voluntary 
delisting are appropriate. Thus, any listed firm considering voluntarily delisting should exercise caution. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although the number of voluntarily delisting firms increased steadily between 1996 and 2012, empirical research on 
this topic has been limited by difficulties in data collection. This research examined the attributes of voluntarily 
delisted firms by focusing on factors such as growth prospects, largest shareholder ratio, liquidity, and industry sector. 
In addition, voluntarily delisted firms were compared with listed firms within the same industry to assess changes in 
management performance after voluntary delisting. Firms that voluntarily delisted from the KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
Exchanges between 1996 and 2012 were used for the analysis. Research models were built for the four presented 
hypotheses and empirical analyses were conducted through logistic regression. 
 
The results of the research are as follows. First, firms with higher growth voluntarily delist more frequently. The 
undervaluation of firm value is often cited as a major reason for voluntary delisting. If a firm is valued below the 
figure its management believes to be the intrinsic value, management may choose to voluntarily delist. In addition, 
firms with high growth prospects voluntarily delist to enable the largest shareholders to take full advantage of future 
growth value.  
 
Second, firms with high largest shareholder ratios voluntarily delist more frequently than those with low largest 
shareholder ratios, which could be interpreted in two ways. Firms with high largest shareholder ratios are in a better 
position to acquire the minimum shareholder ratio required under the regulations to apply for voluntary delisting. 
Because it is less costly for such firms to acquire any remaining shares, it is easier for them to privatize. Another 
perspective accounts for the influence of the compulsory delisting regulations. Listed firms are required to meet certain 
minimum trading volumes for their shares each month. If those requirements are not met, the companies are forced to 
delist. As the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder increases, the number of shares being traded in the stock 
market decreases. Minimum trading volumes might not be met because of the low number of outstanding shares. 
Moreover, in such cases, firms have less need to remain listed because they have less incentive to raise capital through 
stock markets. Consequently, firms with high largest shareholder ratios have more incentive than other firms to 
voluntarily delist. This is the key incentive for Korean firms to voluntarily delist. 
 
Third, firms with higher liquidity more frequently delist voluntarily compared with firms with lower liquidity. Because 
the voluntary delisting process requires significant capital, firms must have sufficient available liquidity. The results 
of this analysis revealed that voluntarily delisted firms had higher liquidity than listed firms within the same industry. 
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Fourth, firms in non-high-tech industries more frequently voluntarily delist than those in high-tech industries. In 
Korea, firms in non-high-tech industries such as textiles, clothing, construction, and wholesale/retail more often 
voluntarily delist than high-tech firms concerned about management secrets and technology leaks. 
 
Additionally, in the analysis of changes in firms after voluntary delisting and the comparison of such firms with 
continuously listed companies, it was found that total assets, sales, and net profit decreased over time for companies 
that delisted. This result suggests that the largest stockholders or executives in such companies should more prudently 
consider the decision to voluntarily delist. 
 
In this study, a specific empirical analysis of the characteristics of voluntarily delisted firms was conducted, and a 
contribution was made to this field by identifying changes in the business performance of companies after their 
voluntary delisting. Of the 35 firms that voluntarily delisted from the KOSDAQ, 22 (63%) went private within five 
years, possibly because their managers lacked an understanding of the listing or because the market participants and 
managers had different perspectives. The results of this study indicated that it is necessary to provide firms considering 
listing with sufficient guidance. This study is thus meaningful because it presents useful information for the decision-
making of companies considering applying for voluntary delisting, including changes in the business performance 
indicators of voluntarily delisted firms before and after their delisting. 
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END NOTES 
 
1. In 2004, eBay, the largest shareholder of Auction Co., Ltd, bought a sizeable share through an open-market 
purchase, thus meeting the requirements of the stock exchange, and voluntarily delisted Auction Co., Ltd. 
Additionally, Chinese Food Packaging, a KOSDAQ-listed company, decided to voluntarily delist via an open-
market purchase in 2009, as did Kookje Electric Korea, an affiliate of Hitachi Kokusai Electric Inc., in 2014. 
Additionally, in 2015, Kyung Chang Industrial Corporation announced that it would make a public purchase of 
the registered common stock of its affiliate, KCW. A company representative explained, “This public purchase 
aims to found a joint company, and if it meets the required procedures of the relevant laws, regulations and rules 
after the purchase, we will apply for the voluntary delisting of KCW under the cooperation of the largest 
stockholder.” 
2. Songwon Color listed on the KOSPI Exchange on January 30, 1996 and delisted on December 5, 2001. Seah 
Metal listed on the KOSDAQ Exchange on May 10, 2001 and delisted on December 20, 2004. These two firms 
went private again only three to five financial years after going public. T-Broad listed on the KOSDAQ Exchange 
on July 26, 2011, but delisted on November 1, 2011. 
3. Dell World 2013: The Very Public Resurgence of a Newly-Private Company. Retrieved from 
http://www.alleywatch.com/2013/12/dell-world-2013-the-very-public-resurgence-of-a-newly-private-company/ 
4. Listing periods are categorized based on monthly units. For example, EDIS Medical Co., Ltd was listed on the 
KOSDAQ on January 24, 2003 and delisted on June 29, 2010. Since the company was listed for seven years and 
five months, it was classified as being listed for “less than eight years.” Sungwoo Mold Co., Ltd, which was listed 
on August 21, 2001 and delisted on April 21, 2010, was categorized as being listed for “less than nine years,” 
because the listing period was eight years and eight months in total. 
5. The foreign literature on voluntary delisting uses free cash flow instead of liquidity (Jenson, 1986; Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989). However, this research uses liquidity as a proxy for a company’s ability to make public tender 
offerings. 
6. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) classified chemicals and drugs, machinery, electrical equipment, 
communications, and instruments with a high R&D to sales ratio as high-tech industries. Chang and Chen (2002) 
classified integrated circuits, computers, peripherals, telecommunications, optical electronics, precision 
machinery, and biotechnology as high-tech industries. A similar set of industries was identified by Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994), Chang and Chen (2002), and Kim (2012).  
7. Kim (2012) assigned a value of 1 to a company if the ratio of the market value to the book value per share was 
higher than the median, and a value of 0 otherwise, as a proxy variable of companies’ growth, to analyze the 
relationship between manager compensation and investment in R&D costs in companies with high growth. This 
study also uses the PER as a dummy variable to examine whether the value of companies that voluntarily delist 
are over- or underestimated in the same industry. 
8. Most voluntarily delisted firms have high largest shareholder ratios before delisting. However, for eight firms, 
the largest shareholder changed during the two years before delisting. In eight other firms, institutional investors 
became the main shareholders within two years of delisting. It is thus likely that such new largest shareholder or 
institutional investor involvement was for voluntary delisting. However, the involvement of institutional investors 
was not considered in this research because of difficulties in gathering information about such involvement in 
continuously listed firms. 
9. The VIF (variance inflation factor) is known to be more desirable than simple correlation coefficients for 
providing accurate information on multicollinearity among explanatory variables. Chatterjee and Price (1977) 
insisted that there is no serious problem of multicollinearity if the VIF is less than 10.  
10. In the penultimate and ultimate years before delisting, no significant differences in SIZE are found between 
voluntarily delisted firms and listed firms, as shown in Table 4. However, the SIZE value is lower for voluntarily 
delisted firms at the 1% level for all five years after delisting. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Definition of Variables 
DELISTi,t+1 Coded as 1 if firm i voluntarily delisted in period t+1 and 0 otherwise. 
PERDMi,t  The PER dummy represents the growth of a firm. It was coded as 1 if the PER of a firm was higher 
than the PER of the industry median in period t and 0 otherwise. The PER is the price to earnings 
ratio (i.e., price per share/earnings per share). 
LARGEi,t The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder. 
CASSETi,t Current ratio: current assets/current debt.  
HTIDMi,t Coded as 1 if firm i belonged to a high-tech industry in period t and 0 otherwise. 
LEVi,t Debt ratio: debt/assets. 
TATi,t Total asset turnover ratio: sales/assets. 
ROAi,t Net income ratio: net income/assets. 
SIZEi,t Firm size: log of total assets.  
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NOTES 
